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CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

IN LATIN AMERICA:
LAW, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE*
Tom Farer'

INTRODUCTION

After near death experiences, each its own grisly tale, elected governments are reappearing throughout Latin America.' What distinguishes

this moment is not so much their mere existence, since elected governments were also the norm in certain earlier periods, but the character of
their elections. Most of the recent elections in Latin American countries

were verified by respected international observers. Thus, they differ
markedly from the electoral charades conducted, for instance, by the

Somoza family in Nicaragua for four decades, or, over much the same
period, by the armed forces of El Salvador.2

Another distinguishing feature of the extant elected regimes is their
relative freedom from ideological competition.' Faith in Communist
models appears utterly shattered except in surviving covens of the Peru-

vian Maoists who kill under the banner of Sendero Luminoso." While

*

A similar version of this essay has been published in DFMiOCRACY, MARKET

ECONOMIES AND THE LAW: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (Wemer Ebke and Detlev Vagts eds., 1995).

** Grazier Fellow, Professor and Director of the Joint-Degree Program in Law
and International Relations at The American University.
1. See Irwin P. Stotzky, The Fragile Bloom of Democracy, 44 U. MIAMI L
REV. 105, 106 (1989).
2. See ROBERT PASTOR, CONDtNED TO REPETITION: THE UNITED STATES AND
NICARAGUA (1987); see also REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMlSSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (1978).

3. See Keith S. Roserm, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States
and its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L REV.
1, 27-30 (1990) [hereinafter Success of Constitutionalism].
4. See SCOTr PALMsR, TERRORISM IN CoNTExF (1994).
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authoritarian populist or reactionary paradigms were not liquidated, for
the moment they seem enfeebled as competitors for the mantle of legitimacy.
Still a third notable feature of the new wave of elected regimes is
their commitment to mutual support, a commitment formalized in 1991
by the Declaration of Santiago,' adopted by the General Assembly of
the Organization of American States. Breaking with a strong tradition of
hostility toward intervention to shape political developments in Western
hemisphere states, the Latin members of the Organization initiated this
call for the mutual defense of elected governments and the concomitant
adoption of procedures for concerting action to reverse unconstitutional
seizures of power.6
The Declaration is a sign of unparalleled belief in the importance of
democratic government, as well as a symbol of uneasiness about its
prospects-an uneasiness amply justified by subsequent events in Haiti,
Peru, Guatemala, and Venezuela, to name the most disturbing cases.'
Politicians and intellectuals in the Western hemisphere concede that in
most countries democracy is not yet "consolidated" or "stabilized."
Some persuasively argue that in perhaps as many as half of the countries with elected governments, true democracy is not even in place.' I
share that view.
The most widely acknowledged definition of democracy is probably
still the one enunciated by Joseph Schumpeter in his classic work, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.9 According to Schumpeter, democracy is an institutional arrangement in which the power to decide is determined by a competition for the people's votes.' ° This is democracy as
the political analogue of a liberal economic system. As producers compete for consumer preference manifested in purchases, politicians compete for consumer preference manifested in votes." In order to satisfy
the liberal individualist values that animate and justify it, the competition must be fair. Students and practitioners of antitrust law will attest
that the concept of "fair competition" is far from easy to define, and

5. AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), approved June 4, 1991.
6. AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), approved June 5, 1991.
7. Rosenn, supra note 3, at 28-30.
8. See Larry Diamond, Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and
Directions for Consolidation, in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: COLLECTIVELY DEFENDING
DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (T. Farer ed. 1995).
9. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1947).
10. Id. at 269.
11. Id.
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even more difficult to apply in complex societies where resources and
skills are very unevenly distributed. Initial success achieved through
luck, skill, or undetected (inadequately sanctioned) predation translates
into market power which thereafter tilts the field of play.
On the demand side, election monitors can determine whether present
power holders distort the expression of preference by inhibiting access
to the voting booth or miscounting the votes. On the supply side, they
can identify the gross barriers to entry or changes in market shares.
They have no mandate, however, to rule elections unfair, either on the
grounds of grossly false advertising by the winners--concerning their
own resumes and programs-or on the grounds that the winners exploited previously acquired advantages in wealth, celebrity, and prestige
arising from the occupation of public and private offices. They have no
mandate to take these considerations into account because to do so
would challenge the legitimacy of electoral systems in many of the
established democracies.
This is only the first, and arguably the lesser, difficulty in construing
and applying Schumpeter's dictum. The second difficulty concerns not
the character, but the result of the competition. What is the competition?
Is it a competition for the power to decide all issues that bear on the
electorate's concerns, or only those which are properly subject to political resolution, that is, resolution by the public authorities? Who but the
electorate is entitled to decide on the allocation of issues between the
public and private realms? Or does democracy, by its nature, presume a
sphere of life beyond the reach of official power, even if some of the
activities which occur there have broad social consequences?12
In capitalist societies, the decisions of investors and corporate managers generally do more to shape quotidian life for most of the electorate
than do the decisions of elected officials, or the persons who work
under their direction. 3 Additionally, in many capitalist democracies,

12. See Donald Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EORY
LJ. 837 (1991) (discussing how democratic polities differ significantly in their view

of the proper reach of government action including regulation of and intervention in
nominally voluntary transactions). The social capitalist ideology of a democratic state
like Germany legitimates considerably more public action on behalf of community
interests than the laissez faire capitalist ideology of the United States.
13. The exceptions to this rule in normal periods are people rich enough to insulate their lifestyle from the consequences of private decision-making in the economic
sphere and the very poor who depend for their survival on public transfers of goods
and services. Perhaps we should add those professional criminals who organize their
lives around coerced transfers.
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constitutional provisions shield property from less than fully compensated takings and thus preclude public action to alter the distribution of
capital. Moreover, certain key public institutions, particularly the central
banks, are insulated in varying degrees from direct political control. 4
Nevertheless, because constitutions can be changed, albeit by weighted
majorities, and because the private economy, at least in theory, can be
comprehensively regulated or its impacts partially offset, most of us find
capitalist arrangements comfortably compatible with, in fact a necessary
condition for, Schumpeterian democracy. What neither this, nor any
other conception of democracy, can accommodate is a system in which
the symbolic power of elected officials is blunted by the raw power of
people with guns-a system like the one traditionally found in many
Latin American countries where the military institution, acting for itself
and allied civilian elites, defines the limits of decision by elected officials.
The perceived exigencies of the Cold War encouraged some Western
officials virtually to equate democracy with elections. 5 Elected
anti-communist governments, which behaved in ways indistinguishable
from frankly authoritarian ones, were conventionally described merely as
"flawed." The passing of the Cold War removed the strategic incentives
to prevarication. Now a consensus prevails to the effect that fair elections, rooted in a formally democratic constitutional structure, are a
necessary, but insufficient, condition for declaring a regime democratic.
There seems equally broad agreement that another condition for earning
the label of "democracy" is generalized respect for civil liberties. Two
reasons support factoring civil liberties into the governing definition. The
first reason, which is instrumental, is that fair elections require respect
for civil liberties all of the time, not just during the pre-electoral period.
The other reason stems from a wider idea of what democracy connotes-an idea which fuses Schumpeter's procedural definition with a
more classic one which emphasizes the output or the consequences of
democracy, above all a wide sphere of individual autonomy.
The fairness of elections, the protection of civil liberties, and the real
decision-making power of elected officials are all obviously matters of
degree. In terms of these and other defining features, countries with
elected regimes are located along a broad continuum. Qualitative distinc-

14. See

WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS

OF THE TEMPLE:

How

THE FEDERAL

RE-

SERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY (1987).
15. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: UNITED STATES
POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS (1991).
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tions are, nevertheless, unavoidable to the extent that governments, acting alone or in concert, are determined to invest resources for the defense and promotion of democratic regimes. Three of the most learned
students of the democratic phenomenon-Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and
Seymour Martin Lipset--urge a distinction between democracies and
"semi-democracies." Semi-democracies are:
those countries where the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political party competition is so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of elections so compromised, that electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; andfor where civil
and political liberties are so limited that some political orientations and
interests are unable to organize and express themselves. 6
Conceding that "there has been tremendous democratic progress in
Latin America and the Caribbean over the past decade," Diamond still
concludes that only eleven of the twenty-two Latin countries in the
hemisphere should fall within the democratic category; and of the eleven, as many as six are much closer in character to semi-democracies
than to the fully-institutionalized democracies of North America and
Western Europe. 7 While some observers might be a little more generous in their labeling, virtually all serious students of Latin American
political systems recognize that most fail to deliver a high level of protection for civil liberties, fail to guarantee anything approximating the
rule of law, and fail to provide all sectors of the society a reasonable
opportunity to participate in the formation and implementation of public
policy. Many of the post-authoritarian elected regimes in other parts of
the world, particularly Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and
Africa, share these defects.' 8 Inevitably feeding on themselves, chronic
performance failures underscore, as well as help to explain, the fragility
of the latest democratic trend.
The formal title of the conference at which a draft of this paper was
presented was "Legal Problems of Transition to Democracy." I construed
the intention behind the title as identifying the ways in which "law"
may burden or facilitate the transition from authoritarian to elected governments, and the ways in which it can contribute to deepening their
roots and enhancing their democratic character.

16. 4 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs: LATIN AMEIucA xvii (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1989).
17. Diamond, supra note 8, at 14-15 (of prepublication manuscript).
18. John Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CI.
L. REv. 447, 639-42 (1991).
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By "law," our conveners doubtless intended to include both what
H.L.A. Hart called the "primary rules" governing quotidian behavior in
civil society, and the secondary rules which indicate how, when, and by
whom the primary rules are to be recognized, construed, and enforced.' Also included in the conveners' conception of "law," I am
sure, was the legal culture, that complex of often half-articulated,
half-conscious ideas about the nature, meaning, place and importance of
law, lawyers, legal discourse, and institutions in the organization and
function of a particular country's life.
Law, so conceived, is bound to be more than a dependent variable.
At the same time, its actual or potential role in the problematic
transitions now occupying the stages of Eastern Europe, Africa, and
Latin America is powerfully constrained by the larger culture, and by
the historical experience and political, economic, and social structures of
the various national actors. Like Tolstoy's unhappy families, each country has its own peculiar features. Still I think certain region-wide generalizations are possible. Certainly with respect to Latin America, I will
not be the first to try to identify them.
I. THE PROBLEMATIQUE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA
Latin American states possess at least eight distinct characteristics
which set them apart from North America and Western Europe. One
feature of Latin American states often remarked upon is the tendency to
concentrate power.2' It is concentrated first in the central government,
in the capital city, and then within a single individual in that government, the President, whether for life or for an elected term. A second
feature of Latin American states, standing in ironic contrast to the first,
is a flaccid state bureaucracy, which is easily colonized by well organized social forces, in part because it lacks self-respect and an animating
sense of the state as having its own purposes." A third characteristic
of Latin American politics is the failure of political parties in most
countries to serve as effective rationalizers of political life by aggregating the demands of the various sectors of the population and converting

19.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW

(1962).

20. CLAUDIO VELIZ, THE CENTRALIZING TRADITION IN LATIN AMERICA (1980);
see Alejandro Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina: Partial
Failure or Qualified Success? 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1993)
21. See JOEL MIGDAL, STRONG SOCIETIES AND WEAK STATES (1988) (providing a

penetrating discussion of state-society relations in what we used to call, for purposes
of summary reference, the Third World).
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those demands into political programs, which, if implemented, would
actually promote the demanded ends. Instead, Latin American political
parties have served as vehicles for personalistic, paternalistic rule, in the
first place by the chief executive and secondarily by local bosses, or
"Caciques," dispensing government favors."
A fourth distinct characteristic of Latin American states is the officer
corps, a military institution, with a tradition of alienation from civil
society, of legal impunity, and of imagining itself the ultimate interpreter
and guardian of the nation's essence.5 A fifth feature of Latin
American states is the frequent recourse by the Executive to states of
emergency and a concomitant suspension of those portions of the constitution which protect individual rights.24 A sixth characteristic is a notably unequal distribution of wealth.' The seventh distinguishing feature
of Latin American states is a high degree of state involvement in the
economy.' Finally, the eighth feature that sets Latin American states
apart from their Western European and North American counterparts,
related in varying degrees to all of the other features, is the weakness of
the rule of law.'
Whatever else it may connote, the rule of law requires the state to
extend its largesse and apply its sanctions effectively, in a manner consistent with published norms, and without reference to the social status
and political connections of the persons affected: In other words, treating
like cases alike, and defining like cases in accordance with the broad
principles and policies which theoretically animate the rule at issue.

22. PoLrncAL PARTEs AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AmRICA (Louis Goodman,
et al. eds., 1992).
23. See KAREN RmEER, MILrrARY RULE IN LATIN AMEICA (1989); ALAN
ROUQUIE, THE MILrrARY AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA (1989).

24. See, e.g.,

REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

OF AMRICAN STATES (1980) (commenting critically
about the extent to which the use of states of emergency as tools of governance had
become chronic).
ON COLOMBIA,

ORGANIZATION

25. See JOHN SHEAHAN, PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 23

(1987). The World Bank estimates that the share of income going to the poorest
twenty percent of the region has decreased in Latin America. This is the only region
where this has happened. There is a "striking difference" between East Asian and
Latin American countries. The former experienced "high average growth and low
inequality," while the latter experienced "slower or negative growth and higher inequality." Lessons from the East?, 5 HEMISFILE 4-6 (1994).
26. Lessons from the East?, supra note 25, at 8.
27. See Keith Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America,
19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 23-31 (1987).
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Reality is a personalistic politics based upon the exchange of favors in
states where the state has many favors to exchange, where bureaucracies
are bloated and bureaucrats underpaid and underappreciated, where judges are often seen as a species of bureaucrat, where the military resists
the jurisdiction of the civil authorities, where class differences are sharply defined, and where many constitutional restraints on the power of
public officials are thought to operate only in periods of tranquility. This
is not a context highly favorable to the rule of law: The German
Rechstaat or the Spanish Estado de Derecho.
Where the rule of law does not prevail-that is, where the rules of
behavior solemnly proclaimed by elected officials do not with fair consistency predict the outcome of social and economic transactions, and do
not in fact regulate the behavior of the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and
the police, in their relations with the citizenry-democracy is nominal,
because its crankshaft is broken. One could, therefore, summarize the
whole problematique of law in the transition to democracy in terms of
the means and obstacles for establishing the rule of law. Against this
background, one can easily see the importance attached by many observers to an issue that plagues transitions no less in Eastern Europe than in
Latin America, the issue of whether, how, and whom to punish for the
abusive acts of harsh predecessor regimes.
II. AMNESIA, AMNESTY, PUNISHMENT: WHAT IS JUST?28
While the issue haunts transitions in both Latin America and Eastern
Europe on the whole, it does so in antithetical ways. In some Eastern
European countries the supposedly unshakable communist regime simply
disintegrated and its opponents occupied the rubble.29 In others, the loss
of faith, will, and cohesion drove the regime to negotiate arrangements

28. This subject has excited a whole cottage industry of ratiocination. See
generally Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish
State Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 1 (1990); John L. Moore, Jr., Problems with
Forgiveness: Granting Amnesty under the Arias Plan in Nicaragua and El Salvador,
43 STAN. L. REV. 733 (1991); Aryeh Neier, What Should Be Done About the Guilty?,
N.Y. REv. OF BOOKs, Feb. 1, 1990, at 32; Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:

The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J.
2537 (1991); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute
Grave Human Rights Violations in InternationalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REv. 451 (1990).
29. See Elster, supra note 18, at 451 (offering Romania after Ceaucescu as an
example of a complete takeover).
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which led quickly to its unconditional displacement."0 In both types of
cases the successor governments acquired the unmistakable power to
punish the officers of the old regime and their collaborators as well.
That power is precisely what the successor regimes of Latin America
have lacked.
In all but one of the leading Latin American cases, a still largely
unified and unrepentant military institution dictated, more than it negotiated, the timing and conditions of its return to the barracks from which
it had sallied to seize the state and remake society in its preferred image." These military institutions left no doubt of their dispositions and
their ability to return if newly elected democrats threatened either their
members, or their conception of the national interest. Only the Argentine
military suffered the collapse of unity and will which leads to disorganized retreat. However, despite being responsible for a military debacle
in the Malvinas War, an economic disaster, and a notorious reign of
terror, Argentina's military soon recovered a unity of purpose sufficient
to reassert traditional claims of impunity.'
Victims of state terror and their kin, broadly backed by domestic and
international human rights organizations, appealed to the renascent democratic leaders for help in vindicating their horribly abused rights. Some
also attempted to seize the legal initiative by bringing civil suits against
their erstwhile torturers. As one would anticipate, these efforts played
out differently in each of the relevant countries. It suffices for our purposes to note that only in Argentina did the democratic state, brushing
aside an amnesty the military rulers had granted themselves, prosecute
and convict officers for violations of human rights.'
The prosecution in Argentina came in the wake of a mammoth inquiry commissioned by the government and carried out by private citizens
of high prestige.' This inquiry exposed in searing detail the extermination campaign conducted from 1976 to 1979 by the armed forces against
persons suspected of complicity with the country's clandestine revolutionary groups3 ' By the time the government of President Alfonsin had
completed the trials of a few of the most senior officers from the mili-

30. See id. at 452-54.

31. See Garro, supra note 20, at 16 (contrasting Argentina's struggle for democracy with those of other Latin American states).
32. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Constitutional Moments, Precommitment, and Fundamental Reform: The Case of Argentina, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1070-72 (1993).
33. Garro, supra note 20, at 12.
34. Id. at 15.
35. Id.
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tary regime, it was confronted with the threat of armed resistance from
a military establishment which was sufficiently reunited to defend its
own.36 Consequently, the government felt compelled to call a halt to
further prosecutions, and even to provide the officer corps with protection from prosecution.37 To that end, the government secured passage
of a statute called the "full stop" law, which required any additional
indictments to be brought within sixty days of its passage."
This effort to close the books on the "Dirty War" by suddenly snapping into place a very brief statute of limitations failed in its purpose.
Thousands of people surged forward with complaints and the judicial
system responded with hundreds of new indictments.39 In the face of
this failure, and a barracks uprising by certain junior officers, President
Alfonsin pushed through the Congress a statute popularly known as the
"due obedience" law.' This statute established an irrefutable "presumption," with some exceptions, that military officers who followed orders
had carried them out under a state of coercion without any possibility to
inspect, oppose or resist them.4 Unlike its "full stop" predecessor, this
law essentially achieved the government's pragmatic objective of barring
the prosecution of officers below the highest command level, hence
bringing the fleeting era of criminal trials to an end.
During the height of its essay in state terror, Uruguay exceeded all
other Latin American countries in the percentage of citizens detained
and tortured.42 Uruguay's post-transition civil-military confrontation
erupted not from an effort to prosecute, which President Sanguinetti
never even appeared to contemplate, but after judges in civil suits
against officers issued orders for them to appear for judicial interrogation.43 When the Minister of Defense, a high-ranking military officer,
ordered military personnel to refuse to honor subpoenas requiring court
appearances, the Sanguinetti government drove a blanket amnesty

36. Id. at 16 (indicating that Argentina's prosecutions were terminated in response
to threats of armed resistance from a reunited military).
37. Id. at 15.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 16.
41. Id.
42. See LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE 87-88 (1990) (stating
that between 1970 and 1985, over 10% of Uruguay's population went into exile and
of those remaining, one in 50 was detained at one time or another, and one in 500
received a long prison sentence for political offenses).
43. Id. at 167.
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through Congress." After a bitter campaign, the law was upheld in a
referendum forced by its opponents. 45
The post-Pinochet government of Chile is located somewhere between
the Sanguinetti government's by-no-means-uncoerced decision to wall off
the past, and Argentina's policy of detailed exposure of human rights
delinquencies and prosecution of the highest officers of the armed forces. Chile's post-Pinochet government has not challenged the law passed
by the Pinochet dictatorship amnestying almost all acts committed by
the armed forces during the first five years after their seizure of power.' The post-Pinochet government did, however, prosecute the one
crime specially exempted from the amnesty: the assassination of former
Chilean Foreign Minister, Orlando Letellier, and an American associate,
carried out in Washington D.C., by agents of Pinochet's intelligence
services on the orders of its director.47
In addition to prosecuting this assassination, the government also
secured compensation for victims of Pinochet's state terror system.'
Finally, like its Argentine counterpart, Chile's democratic leaders tried to
at least preserve the truth by commissioning an inquiry and endorsing
the resulting detailed account of human rights delinquencies committed
by the armed forces under General Pinochet's leadership.' The postPinochet government did these things while coexisting with a military
institution over which General Pinochet continued to preside by edict of
the transition constitution he imposed and an upper legislative chamber
in which unelected Senators appointed by Pinochet, together with elected
conservative party members, formed a minority sufficient to block constitutional change5 0

44. Id.
45. See id. at 83-236; see also

AMERICAS VATCH, CHALLENGING IMPuNrry: THE
LEY DE CADUCIDAD AND THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN IN URUGUAY (1989).

46. See Jose Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives & Political Constraints:
The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1425, 1436 (1992).
47. Id.
48. Ld. at 1435.

49.
military
Human
Chile's

See Garro, supra note 20, at 11-12 (discussing the Argentinean inquiry into
human rights violations); Jon M. Van Dyke & Gerald W. Berkley, Redressing
Rights Abuses, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 243, 249-51 (1992) (detailing
inquiry into human rights violations by the Pinochet regime); see also THE

INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE LONG ROAD TO JuSTICE: A REPORT ON THE LETELLER-MoFFIT CASE (1991).

50. See Garro, supra note 20, at 12 n.26.
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In addition to their impact on Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, amnesty
and truth-telling were integral components of the U.N.-brokered peace
accord that finally brought El Salvador's civil war to a close." They
are also currently part of the formula which may bring a kind of peace
to Guatemala.52 Finally, amnesty, without a detailed accounting, also
lubricated the end of civil conflict in Nicaragua.53
The Central American cases, like the very recent South African one,
are unique in at least one respect. While their delinquencies may have
differed greatly in extent, intensity, and duration, both parties to the
negotiation-if not their leaders, then at least some of their functionaries-were apparently indictable for violation of human rights or humanitarian law.54 Thus there was a certain element of reciprocity or balance
in the surrendering of claims to justice. It is true that amnesties in Argentina have benefitted surviving members of the subversive organizations as well as the armed forces. The revolutionaries, however, were
not connected to the democratic parties that voted the amnesties; and the
amnesties are not proxies for the many persons bereaved not because
their children, spouses, parents or siblings were part of the subversion,
but because they were friends of those who were, they served as their
defense lawyers, they criticized the armed forces, or they were in the
wrong place at the wrong time. Unlike the FMLN or the ANC, the
Government of Raul Alfonsin and many of the members of civil society
who sought vindication came to the table with clean hands. 5 They required no absolution and received none.
Undeterred by the growing ubiquity of general amnesty in formulas
for the peaceful settlement of internal conflicts, legal scholars in the
transnational human rights movement have almost uniformly condemned
them.56 These scholars have even criticized the more limited measures
that democrats in Chile and Argentina have adopted to appease their
abusive predecessors.57 They have raised three related legal issues. Do
the principal global and regional human rights treaties simply oblige
states to refrain from human rights violations or do they also create
affirmative obligations to defend, reinforce and vindicate rights? If there

51. See generally Moore, supra note 28 (comparing the roles of amnesty in the
peace processes of El Salvador and Nicaragua).
52. Id. at 747.
53. Id.
54. See Zalaquett, supra note 46, at 1427-30.
55. Garro, supra note 20, at 16.
56. See generally Neier, supra note 28; Orentlicher, supra note 28.
57. Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 2538-40.
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are affirmative obligations, does their satisfaction require the state to

prosecute whenever rights have been violated? Are conventional obligations also entrenched in customary international law so that the obligations are in fact universal?
The case for affirmative obligations, developed in the now extensive
literature, is very persuasive. Even before considering contemporary
human rights declarations, conventions, and attendant scholarly discourse,
one might presume the existence of some sort of affirmative obligation
on the part of the state despite the radically altered character of its
government. After all, one of the truisms of international law is that
states, as distinguished from their transient governments, are the bearers
of international rights and duties. Moreover, the notion of an affirmative
obligation is an old one, extending back before the emergence of human
rights law to the antecedent law of state responsibility for injury to
aliens." For example, the U.S.-Mexico Claims Tribunal, established on
the eve of World War II to liquidate, through arbitration, the accumulated disputes of decades, found Mexico responsible where local prosecutors in Mexico had failed to move against a Mexican national who,
according to abundant eye witness testimony, had murdered an American
59
citizen.
Whether the affirmative obligation includes prosecution is an issue at
least slightly more subject to reasonable doubt. In finding the government of Honduras responsible for the disappearance and presumed murder of civilians carried out by a special unit of the armed forces organized by its former commander-in-chief, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights spoke in terms of a governmental obligation to prosecute
and punish those responsible for grave human rights violations.' This
case may be distinguished, however, because the Honduran Government
did not initially concede the violations, made no previous effort to investigate the facts alleged by the original petitioners in the case, never
displayed a disposition to compensate the relatives of the disappeared or
to adopt strong remedial measures, and never attempted to justify its

58. See Richard Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for
Injury to Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY TO

ALiENs 1, 2-3 (Richard Lillich ed., 1983) (discussing the notion of the state's affirmative obligation in relation to aliens).
59. Laura M.B. Janes Claim (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 U.N. REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS
82 (U.S. and Mex. Gen'l Claims Comm'n 1927).
60. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. C. H.R.,
ser. C: Decisions and Judgments, No. 4 9M 64, 174, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291

(1989).
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passivity as necessary for the consolidation of democracy in Hondu6
ras. 1
Disputes over the existence, character, and extent of an obligation to
prosecute go beyond the question of what international law requires to
the broader issue of whether attempts to prosecute will normally enhance the democratic prospect. The human rights community has argued
that truth telling and compensation to victims or their families are very
important, but not enough.61 According to the human rights community,
prosecution is not only required by the letter of international law, but is
a powerful instrument for consolidating nascent democracies, above all
because it affirms the rule of law.63 Conversely, the failure to prosecute
reaffirms the traditional impunity of the military, makes the elected
government an accomplice to a grave violation of the idea of un estado
de derecho, and generally reinforces cynicism about the legal system
and about elected government.' Thus, the fragile child poisons itself.
Human rights advocates do not simply dismiss as irrelevant the military establishment's threats or the claimed healing effects of pardons for
past sins. They argue, however, that in appropriate circumstances, pardons or amnesties after conviction can accommodate both concerns.
The legal, moral, and prudential misdemeanor, they argue, is amnesty
before trial, before the facts are formally established in a proper legal
proceeding.' They condemn the short-circuiting of the legal process.67
Members and supporters of the concerned democratic governments,
ground between the Scilla of still powerful military establishments and
the Charybdis of their erstwhile allies in the human rights communities,
have for the most part pleaded force majeure as mitigating, if not formally exculpating, their placatory restraint.6" In its arguments before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the larger hemispheric public, however, the government of Uruguay bluntly challenged the
case against it on procedural and substantive grounds.69 Uruguay's ar-

61. Id.
62. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 28.
63. See generally id.
64. See generally id.
65. See generally id.
66. See Garro, supra note 20, at 16 (criticizing Argentina's "nunca mas" tribunals); see also WESCHLER, supra note 42, at 167 (noting Uruguay's failure to investigate those military officials who received amnesty).
67. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 28.
68. WESCHLER, supra note 42, at 153-87.
69. Interviews with members of the staff of the Inter-American Commission on
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gument amounts to the claim that governments enjoy a broad margin of
appreciation in deciding how best to fulfill their legal commitments.3
As long as they proceed in good faith along lines that are not plainly
futile, no external body has the right to question their method.V ' The
best means for preventing future violations of human rights is the consolidation of elected government. In the judgment of Uruguay's government, amnesty was important for consolidation '
Either to reinforce this line of reasoning or as a separate strand of
argument, Uruguay's representatives invoked the referendum vote upholding the amnesty, arguing that notions of sovereignty insulate direct
expression of majority preference from external review. On its face, the
claim is meretricious. Political and civil human rights belong by definition to individuals and serve to protect individuals from the acts and
omissions of the state, howsoever constituted. The minority rights provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights directly
contradict any notion that the majority will, unlike dictatorial fiat, can
trump individual rights. 3 Similarly, in the American Convention on
Human Rights declare certain rights non-derogable, implying that whatever the breadth and intensity of majority interest, it cannot trump all
individual claims.!4 Thus if the referendum has any relevance at all, it
is as evidence of the government's good faith in concluding that amnesty was an important, possibly a necessary, condition of continuing progress toward a fully democratic state.
On the amnesty issue, the rule of law has come face-to-face with
Latin realities. Latin America must now decide how to alter the past
realities that made democratic government partial and precarious in those

Human Rights. See generally WESCHLER, supra note 42 (providing a moving account
of the debate about amnesty and prosecution within Uruguay).
70. See WESCHLER, supra note 42, at 230-35 (outlining Uruguay's response to

criticism regarding its handling of human rights violations).
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doec. A16316 (1966) entered into

force March 23, 1976. Article 27 of the Covenant reads as follows: "In those states
in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or
to use their own language." Id. art. 27.
74. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4, T 2, opened for signature
Nov. 22, 1969, OEA/ser. K/XVYI.1, Doec. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. I .A.S.T.S., No. 36
(1970).
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periods where it managed any type of existence. Some initiatives already
taking place in certain countries have little or nothing to do with the
law. For instance, public and private efforts are under way to bridge the
traditional gap between officers and civilians by developing within the
democratic sectors of civil society, a cadre of experts on national defense issues, similar to those found in the United States and Britain."
As far as actual or possible legal projects are concerned, this paper
focuses on two. The first is to strengthen the judiciary in general, with
particular emphasis on the institution of judicial review of both executive and legislative action. The second is to redesign political institutions
to alleviate the problems stemming from weak or dysfunctional parties,
from concentration of power in the presidency, and from confrontation
between the president and the legislature.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
In common law countries with written constitutions, judicial review
denotes a readiness to invalidate acts of executive officials, including the
head of government and the legislature, on the grounds of their formal
or substantive incompatibility with constitutional provisions. 6 Even the
most casual observers of politics in the United States are aware of the
prominent role the federal courts play through the exercise of their review power. American citizens from the otherwise most impotent and
humble levels of society have been able to demolish with one blow long
established and widely accepted practices of the public authorities. At a
time when panhandlers and the homeless compete vigorously for urban
space with solid burghers, many of the latter would doubtless be surprised to learn that for most of the nation's history, persons who appeared unemployed (for reasons other than being the eldest son of a
long-lived monarch) were subject to arrest for "vagrancy," and in lieu of
jail time, or in addition thereto, were forcibly deposited at the city limits
with orders backed by threats not to reappear.7' This means for main-

75. Interview with Virginia Gamba, leading member of the growing fraternity of
Latin civilian strategists.
76. See Justice Robert F. Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, Judicial Review in the
New Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts From a Comparative
Perspective, 54 OHiO ST. L. 559, 568 (1993).
77. See Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons From Cities, 66 TUL. L. REv. 631,
638 (1992); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1971) (noting
that vagrancy statutes were used to eliminate the presence of "undesirables").
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taining a preferred public order, enshrined in ordinances throughout the
land and in the standard operating procedures of local police forces,9

was shattered by one not-so-humble gentleman who chose arrest over
moving on, and had the good fortune to attract the support of a leading
civil liberties organization. 9
Before the Second World War, persons trained in the civil law, the

principal source of national legal systems in Latin America,' found it
unnatural for a court at any level to invalidate settled law and practice
based on its supposed incompatibility with substantive constitutional

provisions, much less language as vague and open-textured as that of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." Why? What was
it about the civil law tradition that made the exercise of constitutional
review, particularly substantive review, appear incompatible with the

judicial function, even in countries widely perceived as venues for the
rule of law?' As Justice Robert F. Utter and David C. Lundsgaard
note in their recent exploration of this question, one might summarize

the answer as codes, positivism, and majoritarianism. Together, these
answers produce a conception of the judicial function very different
from the one that prevails in common-law countries.
Classical civil lawyers began with the premise that all of the law was
in the formally enacted codes.8 These were deemed so clear and de-

tailed, that once the facts of a given case were established, law appliers
78. See, e.g., Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 364-66 (1953) (Black. J., dissenting) (criticizing subsection 5 of § 647 of the Penal Code of California which
fined or imprisoned "idle, lewd or dissolute" persons); Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d
171 (9th Cir. 1931) (invalidating a statute which prohibited idling, loitering, or loafing
upon the streets of the city); Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969)

(holding that Florida's vagrancy statute was unconstitutionally overbroad).
79. See generally Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170 (1971) (invalidating a vague
ordinance used to roust transient, beggars and loungers (i.e. streetcorner society)).
80. See Rosenn, supra note 27, at 33; Robert S. Barker, Constitutional Adjudication in Costa Rica: A Latin American Model, 17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 249,
251 (1986).
81. The Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows: "[n]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV.
82. See James Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, in 1975 SuPw.IE
COURT REviEw 189, 189 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1976) (surveying France's historical
aversion to judicial review).
83. Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 76, at 563-65.
84. See id. at 565 (discussing the civil law theory that judicial interpretation
could add nothing to the precise code).
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needed only to find the right code provision to reach the correct result.
Hence, reasonable judges acting in good faith would all reach the same
result in essentially identical cases. 5 This view necessarily presupposed
that words in the context of texts-as distinguished from the context of
life with its kaleidoscopic patterns of fact, value, and purpose-have a
plain meaning accessible to persons of legal training and unremarkable
intelligence.
A number of things followed from this cluster of assumptions. One
was that the role of judge was much like that of any person in the
public administration engaged in the resolution of claims.86 Let us assume, for instance, that a customs agent must decide whether the 150year old clock you purchased abroad is an "antique," hence
non-dutiable. You produce a document from the seller purporting to
authenticate the clock's age. The agent looks in the customs handbook
and finds a regulation which provides that an antique is any object older
than a century, and that a statement from the seller is sufficient to establish an object's age, unless the agent has reason to doubt the claim.
Since the clock looks vaguely obsolete and its case seems battered, this
agent sees no basis for doubt--end of case.
If judges are only a certain species of bureaucrat, then they should
have a bureaucratic career pattern: finish university with the appropriate
degree, take an exam and possibly a modicum of specialized instruction,
then begin work. Work would begin with relatively simple and inconsequential matters and progress to higher levels largely on the basis of
seniority, protected by, but also subordinate to, the hierarchy and the
traditions of the bureaucratized service, protected above all by a determined anonymity in relation to the public and undeviating neutrality in
relation to the politicians. If politics is the process which determines
who gets what, when, and how, then how can the law do the determining? In the bureaucratic scenario of the judicial function, the judge only
announces the result.
This could not get farther away from the view of classical common
law judges. These judges consciously decide where losses shall fall and
gains shall accrue by crafting a rule of decision, in the manner of a

85. See id. at 564. Under this assumption, of course, there was no place for a
doctrine of stare decisis. Id.
86. See Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and
the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 378 (1982) (referring to classic civil law
judges as "skilled mechanics operating a syllogism machine"); see also Rosenn, supra
note 27, at 33 (characterizing civil law judges as "expert technicians").
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bricoleur, out of available materials: customary practice, widely shared
moral precepts, and public policy.' They then publicly justify the result so that their peers and the public may evaluate it and private citizens may better know the legal consequences of their acts and omissions. Such a judge must have experience of the world, must be in
touch with its customs and expectations, its principles, and its official
discourse about public policy.
Lawyers in the United States starting with the assumptions and attendant self-confidence of the common-law tradition, moved to a very wide
conception of the judging function, which in its essentials remains vital
today."8 They did so by virtue of the sensation of creating a new and
very different society, of selecting and consolidating the liberal elements
in the mixed bag of British political thought,' and of adopting a written and a federal constitution as much designed to restrain as to authorize the exercise of power.' American lawyers nevertheless retain a
certain measure of concern with the problem of reconciling a creative,
politically independent judiciary with majoritarian government.l The
Yale Jurisprude, Alexander Bickel, wrote that judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative acts, and acts of the Executive within its
realm of coordinate or distinctive authority, is anomalous because it
inhibits the expression of popular preference. In fact, Learned Hand,
one of our most celebrated judges, doubted aloud whether judicial review had even been contemplated by the founding fathers, regardless of

87. See Neubome, supra note 86, at 379-82 (discussing how members of France's
Conseil constitutionnel forged judicial review itself from tools such as the text of the
1958 Constitution, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the preamble of the 1958
Constitution, the preamble of the 1946 Constitution, and fundamental principles of the
laws of the Republic, and general principles of French law).
88. See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICiAL REviEW: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 18 (1994).

89. See id. at 20-21 (observing that Hamilton employed several of Blackstone's

rules of interpretation in Federalist no. 83 to interpret the constitutional provision for
trial by jury in criminal cases).
90. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 423 (Garry Wills ed., 1982) (interpreting article

I, § 8 as authorizing only enumerated powers, not general authority).
91. See WOLFE, supra note 88, at 60 (noting that the broadest criticism of John
Marshall, who invented judicial review, is that he applied his own will, rather than
the will of the law and the people); see also Wn.ItAM M. WIACEK, LIBERTY UNDER
LAw: THE SUPREUa5E COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 1 (1990) (exploring the controversial
question of how an undemocratic institution can invalidate the products of democracy).
92. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORAIrTY OF CONSENT 26-27 (Jeannette
Hopkins et al. eds., 1975).
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what4 John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison93 and often thereaf9
ter.
American history illustrates the legitimacy of this concern about the
full-blown exercise of substantive constitutional review. The Supreme
Court's Dred Scott decision,95 which declared unconstitutional the efforts of Congressional moderates to find a compromise between slave
and free states, helped set the country on course to its Civil War.' In
the early part of this century, a conservative Supreme Court majority
and counterparts in some state courts frequently frustrated legislative
efforts to reduce class polarization and to mitigate the severities of rapid
industrial growth under extreme free market conditions.' It seems as
close to certain as any counterfactual hypothesis can be, however, that
in the absence of a tradition of vigorous constitutional review, law and
practice in the United States would deviate much more significantly than
they do from the dictates of international human rights treaties.
Although the act of striking down the deliberate acts of the majority's
representatives entails a kind of arrogance by unelected officials, it is
just such arrogance, or high self-confidence, that is the necessary psychological stance for exercising constitutional review in a highly democratic and/or populist society.9" Judges who envision themselves as little
93. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
94. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (recounting Justice Marshall's view
that James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, did not understand the document).
95. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1856).
96. See WOLFE, supra note 88, at 69-70 (stating that the Dred Scott decision
"exacerbated" the issue of slavery).
97. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New
York law prohibiting bakers from working more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a
day); BICKEL, supra note 92, at 26 (arguing that the justices that ruled on the
Lochner case based their decision on their personal economic convictions which they
derived from the laissez-faire teachings of Herbert Spencer); Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating a federal law prohibiting "yellow dog" employment
contracts, which specified that the employee could be fired for joining a union);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state legislation similar to the
federal "yellow dog" prohibition); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (invalidating regulation of employment practice and rate); Schecther Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 368 (1935) (invalidating act that regulated the conditions and price
of labor for poultry dealers); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating an act regulating labor terms in coal industry). Constitutional scholars speculate
that the Court desisted in applying Spencer's social statistics only when President
Roosevelt threatened to "pack" the Court. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrruTIONAL LAW § 4.7, at 154 (4th ed. 1991) (stating that the Court packing plan was
defeated because the justices "reformed themselves").
98. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 175-80 (stating that the Constitution is a
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more than a species of bureaucrat are generally less likely to have the
necessary confidence," even in places like Japan and Western Europe
where public service has long been a distinguished calling attracting
some of the best and brightest students."W This, it seems to me, is one
reason why civil law systems are strongly inclined to concentrate what-

ever constitutional review they allow in special courts (or quasicourts).' In general, public service has much less prestige and relatively poor remuneration in Latin America.m In terms of introducing

or enlarging substantive constitutional review, that disadvantage is hugely compounded by the physical and financial risks, as well as the fi-

nancial temptations that haunt government officials in many Latin countries.
Despite the civil law's tendency to disparage the imaginative and

creative elements of judicial function, and its historical association with
the idea of legislative supremacy, even in its Gallic heartland, its spirit

has not precluded the evolution of the judiciary as guarantor of constitutional government." Of course, judicial policing of executive action
through specialized courts-culminating in the Conseil d'Etatt--is

virtually coterminous with the consolidation of French democracy in the

higher form of law than the enactments of Congress and that the Court, therefore,
may not enforce those enactments that are not in accordance with the Constitution);
see also MoRRiS RAPHAEL COHEN, THE FAMi OF A LIBERAL 178-80 (1946) (commenting that John Marshall accused James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, of
"either not understanding the Constitution, or else wilfully disregarding it").
99. See Rosenn, supra note 27, at 33 (providing that civil law judges are "weak
figures" who do not enjoy the power, prestige, and deference of United States judges,
and who do not even have the power to jail people who defy their orders for contempt of court).
100. See Robert NV. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L REV. I,
67 (1988) (describing the civil services of Europe and Japan as "prestigious and powerful").
101. See Beardsley, supra note 82, at 216 (explaining that France bestows exclusive jurisdiction for constitutional review of legislative acts upon itsConseil
Constitutionnel). Germany bestows this authority on its Constitutional Court. Kommers,
supra note 12, at 840.
102. See Rosenn, supra note 27, at 29 (stating that the outrageous inflation in
Latin American countries makes judicial salaries illusory, and citing an Argentinean
case where waiters in Buenos Aires earned more than the president of the Supreme
Court).
103. See Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 76, at 570 (providing that even France,
"a hotbed of antipathy to judicial review," established the Conseil constitutionnel to
control the constitutionality of legislation).
104. Neuborne, supra note 86, at 385.
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Third Republic. 5 While that review focused primarily on the question
of whether executive action was consistent with the legislature's declared
will, the Conseil d'Etat gradually expanded its scope of review by drawing on two additional sources of restraint on executive power."
The first was a set of values identified and defined by the Conseil
and often referred to as "general principles of French Law."'" The
other was the preamble to the Fourth Republic's Constitution of 1946
which incorporated the seminal Declaration on the Rights of Man and
an unwritten body of norms described as "fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic."'0 8 The Conseil treated the "general
principles," the Declaration, and the "fundamental principles" as, in Professor Neuborne's words:
an inertial base from which the French executive could not depart without
[explicit] legislative authorization .... Thus .... the Conseil d'Etat used
a separation of powers rationale to justify judicial review of executive
action in derogation of an amorphous, judicially defined set of values,
without ° contesting the power of the legislature to take the challenged
action."
The legislature's impunity from external constitutional review lasted
until 1958. " ' Then, while establishing the constitutional foundations of
a new (the fifth) Republic, the French finally limited legislative supremacy by creating a new institution, the Conseil constitutionnel, and endowing it with the authority to measure legislative enactments against
the constitutional benchmark."' Initially, the Conseil could only exercise this authority at the insistence of the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister, and the Presidents of the Senate and the National Assembly, except in the case of laws affecting the structure of government
and the rules of the two legislative organs.'12 In 1974, however, parliament extended the power to invoke review by the Conseil to any group
comprising at least sixty members of the Senate or Assembly." 3 Since

105. See id. at 384-85.

106. See id.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 385.
See id. at 388.
See id.
Id. at 382 n.67.
Id.
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review power occurred at the instance of
1974, most invocations of the
4

the parliamentary minority."

There is debate over whether the Conseil's decisions to invalidate
legislation are instances of substantive review or enforcement of the
separation-of-powers principle."' Regardless of the underlying rationale

for the Conseil's decisions, the fact remains that it has effectively vetoed
initiatives of the political institution most directly responsive to the

currents of majority will." 6 To that extent, the Conseil has functioned
like the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Germany, another great center of the civil law tradition, the parallel to the United States Supreme Court is far less approximate. The
Federal Constitutional Court,"7 established by the 1949 Constitution,
arguably surpasses its United States counterpart in jurisdictional reach

and unabashed normative creativity."' Unlike the United States Supreme Court, it need not always await a specific case or controversy
before clarifying the constitutional status of a contested assertion of
legislative power. Immediately following the enactment of a statute, the

114. Id.
115. Neuborne, supra note 86, at 363-67. Neubome's conclusion, the thrust of his
whole article, is that "separation of powers-based theory of judicial review is capable
of proving protection for important substantive values without running afoul of democratic political theory." Id. at 367.
116. See Neubome, supra note 86, at 389-90 nn.94, 96, 390-410 (discussing cases).
117. See generally Kommers, supra note 12, at 837-45 (tracing the history of the
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany).
118. See generally id. at 837-45 (characterizing German constitutionalism primarily
as interpreted by Germany's highest Court of review). See also DONALD P.
KOmMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBuC OF GERmANY (1989) (evaluating German constitutionalism and its highest constitutional court);
Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CAL. L REV. 1017
(1970) (arguing that although judicial review is seemingly different in various countries, it is responsive to social problems common throughout the world). In comparing
judicial review in Germany with that in the United States, Professor Kommers states:
[i]n the United States, by contrast, the main task of constitutional theory is to
find the source and establish the limits of judicial review ... . This situation
poses a dramatic irony: on the one hand, judicial review is one of the hallmarks of American constitutionalism; on the other hand, there exists no 'convincing theoretical explanation of where the Supreme Court's power comes from
and how it should be used.' Supplying that explanation has become the central
focus of American Constitutional theory.
Kommers, supra note 12, at 842-43 (quoting Bert Neubome, Justiciability. Remedies,
and the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 3 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987).
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government, or its opponents in the parliament, or the government of
any of the federation's constituent units (the Lander), may petition the
Court"9 and obtain a definitive ruling as to whether the statute is facially unconstitutional.'
The German Court is also unencumbered by the perceived constitutional or prudential constraints that influence the United States Court to
treat certain acutely controversial issues as "political questions," which
are thus exempt from judicial review.'
On the contrary, the German
Court obligates itself to answer all questions of constitutional interpretation brought before it by persons or institutions authorized to invoke its
jurisdiction." Authorization extends to "any person who claims that
one of his basic rights . . . has been violated by the public authorities."' The German Court's sense of obligation flows naturally from
its underlying conviction that "any law, administrative regulation, legal
relationship, or political practice that cannot be
justified in terms of the
24
unconstitutional."'
definition
by
is
Basic Law
If as a consequence of its own jurisprudence, the Court cannot avoid
resolving constitutional issues that come before it, neither can it temporize in their resolution by selectively exercising its reviewing power, or
by awaiting the gradual trudge of those issues through the lower
courts."z For if at any point in a proceeding in an inferior court, including an administrative court, the Judge identifies a constitutional issue
in the pending case, the Judge postpones the proceeding and
sends the
26
issue to the Constitutional Court for a final determination.
With respect to the constitutional merits of a matter, the Court adopts
a view of the Basic Law which appears to endow the Court with broad
discretion to choose among competing social values and interests. 27

119. THE BASIC LAW (German Const.) art. 93(1). In order for Parliament to petition the German Federal Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of a statute,
the petition must be supported by one-third or more of the members. Id.
120. Id. art. 93 (1).
121. See Kommers, supra note 12, at 842 (arguing that the jurisdiction and authority of the German Federal Constitutional Court are relatively undisputed). These
controversial issues, such as limits of executive power in the conduct of foreign affairs, have an indirect effect, if any, on civil liberties. Id. at 849.
122. See generally id. at 840-45.
123. TEt BAsic LAW (German Const.) art. 19(4).
124. Kommers, supra note 12, at 648.
125. Id.

126.

THE BASIC LAW

(German Const.) art. 100(1).

127. See generally Kommers, supra note 12, at 871 (describing the methodology
used by the Court in weighing opposing rights and values).
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While the American Constitution protects negative liberty by protecting
individuals from injurious actions by the government, the Basic Law
embodies human values which it requires the state to incorporate into its
positive law." Hence, in Germany, the legislature's failure to act-for
example, a failure to declare that the fetus has a right to life and therefore a failure to criminalize abortion'--can trigger the Court to find a
constitutional violation. The Court's potential scope of substantive review is expansive since the Court treats every provision of the Basic
Law, no matter how open-textured, as implying the existence of enforceable rights.' Article 20(1) of the Basic Law, for example, states that
"[tihe Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal
state."'' Since the Court has previously interpreted the word "social"
to mean "social welfare," it has thus breathed content into the term by
calling it a basic constitutional "principle."'" The Court applied this
principle along with other constitutional materials when it struck down
an effort to limit admissions in order to limit overcrowding at two law
and medical schools.'
French and German experience demonstrates that nothing in the civil
law constitutes an insuperable obstacle to the evolution of robust judicial
review of executive and legislative behavior. Moreover, since Europe
exercises strong cultural influence over Latin America, particularly over
its educated elite, Europe's changing conceptions of the judiciary's proper role should increase Latin American receptivity to energetic constitutional review." Indeed, if legal institutions enjoyed a partially autonomous existence, one might expect Latin America to anticipate developments at the civil law's Gallic root. For when Latin American leaders
began designing constitutions in the wake of their successful wars of

128. See generally id. at 855-63 (analyzing the structure of rights and values in
Germany).
129. See id. at 870-72 (explaining that the "right to life," guaranteed in the German Constitution and protected by the state, also extends to the fetus).
130. See Kommers, supra note 12, at 855-63 (discussing the German Federal Supreme Court's interpretation of the Basic Law).
131. THE BASIC LAW (German Const.) art. 20(l).
132. See Kommers, supra note 12, at 865-66 (noting that according to German
constitutional theorists, the Courts interpretation of the term "social" require the state
to contribute to human growth and development).
133. Id. at 865.
134. See generally THE U.S. CONsTrTIMON AND THE CONsTrrUTIONS OF LATIN
AtMEICA (Kenneth Thompson ed., 1991) (discussing the influence of other constitutions on the development of Latin American constitutions).
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independence, they were also influenced by the thriving constitutional
system in the United States, a system already marked by an assertive
and self-confident Supreme Court.'35
Assuming that Latin America can overcome these psychological and
material impediments to the vigorous exercise of judicial review, how
solid are the grounds for confidence that the judiciary will not abuse the
power of review? By abusing the power of review, I mean using it to
impede rather than to facilitate realization of the human rights immanent
in a fully democratic society. Is there not a danger that greater power
will attract more violence and corruption? Can a state in which the
bureaucracy has proven vulnerable to corruption and colonization by
powerful interests protect the judiciary from the same experience? Furthermore, given the fact that the distribution of wealth and capital is
more skewed in Latin America than any of the other regions that were
formerly known collectively as the Third World, is it not likely that
representatives of the propertied classes will staff the highly energized
constitutional courts? Will not they, like their conservative predecessors
in the United States, use judicial review to obstruct redistributive measures authorized by electoral majorities, or block changes in the electoral
system and other institutional arrangements that might ease the translation of majority preference into public policy?
I can claim no systematic study of Latin America's constitutional
jurisprudence. The scattered evidence that is readily available to people
like myself who follow Latin politics, however, provides a basis for the
foregoing concerns. After the 1973 coup d'etat in Chile, the honorable
Justices of its Supreme Court contrived to discover the elements of
constitutional legitimacy in the ensuing dictatorship.'36 Moreover, they
consistently sidestepped or rejected efforts by human rights advocates to
use the judicial process to pry open the regime's torture chambers and
to prevent the processless exile of whomever it chose to dislike.'37
As for El Salvador's Supreme Court, the "Truth Commission,"'38 established under U.N. auspices as part of the civil war settlement agree-

135. See generally id. (evaluating the actual degree of influence initially exerted
on Latin American democracies by the United States constitutional experience).
136. See Robert Vaughn, Proposals for Judicial Reform in Chile, 16 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 577, 583-88 (1992/1993).
137. See generally id.
138. See Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497 (1994) (describing the process by which the
Truth Commission gathers information and presents recommendations to El Salvador's
Supreme Court).
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ment, found the Court's actions and omissions so flagrantly inconsistent
with the rule of law that it identified the Court as one of the major
obstacles to ending the war and establishing the rule of law. To be fair,
governments of little or no democratic pretensions controlled appointments to El Salvador's Court. The Chilean Justices, however, found their
seats through the workings of one of the most authentic and sustained
39
democratic systems in the southern part of the hemisphere.
The Argentine judiciary's response to finding itself part of a regime
employing terrorist means was much less active cooperation, as in the
Chilean case, than lethargy, a mode of being made easy by the fact that
the governing officers, students of the world's reaction to Pinochet's
open brutality, surrounded their extraordinary measures with night and
fog.'" It appears that Argentine judges only summoned the moral energy to challenge lawless behavior on three occasions, all of which
occurred after pitiless state terror shattered the spine of the clandestine
anti-governments movements. In challenging this lawlessness, the Argentine judiciary demonstrated the considerable contribution courts can
make to democratic consolidation.' 4'
The first instance in which the Argentine courts challenged the
government's lawless behavior was the case of journalist Jacobo
Timerman. Originally kidnapped and carried off to a clandestine torture
center--"disappeared," to use the idiom of that moment-Timerman'"
was propelled to the surface by international outcry. Although no longer
among the disappeared, he remained a prisoner, the object of various
criminal charges which the government seemed disinclined to test in
court. After a delay of two years in an action brought by Timerman's
family on his behalf, the Supreme Court ordered his release, finding that

139. See generally PAUL C. SIGMUND, THE OvERTHROW OF ALLENDE AND THE
PoLrncs oF CHILE, 1964-1976 (1977).
140. See generally IN GuEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES (1990) (describing
the clandestine measures employed by the Argentine military). See also INTER-ANI.
C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SrruATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA (Organization
of American States 1990) (hereinafter REPORT ON THE STuAmON OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN ARGENTINA) (recounting human rights violations in Argentina).
141. See generally GUEST, supra note 140.
142. See JACOBO TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL. WITHOUT A
NuMBER (Toby Talbot trans., 1981) (recounting the story of Jacobo Timerman's ordeal with the Argentine military). Jacobo Timerman was one among many moderate
figures who, despairing of the chaotic and violent conditions that prevailed under the
inept and corrupt regime of Isabel Peron, originally supported military intervention. Id.
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the charges against him were completely unsupported by evidence."
The regime complied to the extent of stripping Timerman of his Argentine citizenship and expelling him from the country.'"
The Court's decision has limited precedental significance, however,
because of the notoriety of the case and the government's brazen effort
to detain Timerman indefinitely without even a reasonable suspicion that
he posed a threat to public order. But in two instances which were
unaffected by salient demonstrations of international concern, the Court,
applying the same standard of "reasonableness" used in the Timerman
case, also found abuses of discretion. 45
Through these tiny checks to arbitrary rule" the Argentine Supreme
Court demonstrated the contribution that self-confident, independent
constitutional courts can make to the protection of human rights and
elected governments. The Chilean and Salvadoran courts, on the other
hand, legitimize fears that such courts are at least as likely to defend
47
extreme privilege, as they are to defend representative government.
One way of reducing the latter risk is to emphasize the special task of
constitutional courts and the corresponding need to develop a selection
process calculated to produce justices whose philosophies of government
and views of the court's role are compatible with democratic reform.
It might also be useful, albeit dangerous, to provide a process for
modifying the Court's composition in the event that it abuses its power.
For instance, the constitution might provide for an increase in the number of justices by a weighted vote less than that required for a constitutional amendment. Another way to reconcile independent constitutional
review with majority rule under the particular conditions that prevail in
contemporary Latin America is to provide for something less than irreducible lifetime tenure on the Court. For example, justices could serve

143. Timerman, Jacobo, CSJN, 300 Fallos 816 [1978-C] L.L. 586.
144. See REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA, supra
note 150, at 173.
145. See Garro, supra note 20, at 56 n.178.
146. Argentina's courts have consistently refused to recognize a power to review
not only particular statutes and decrees enacted during states of emergency, but also
the decision to declare the emergency and suspend individual rights.
147. Ironically, six years before the Chilean judiciary would lend itself to the
protection and legitimation of Chile's military putschists, Chile unwittingly established
the principal means to that end, namely a special Constitutional Tribunal with the
power to rule on the general constitutionality of laws and to decide disputes between
the executive and the legislature. See SIGMUND, supra note 139, at 17.
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an initial long term (perhaps a decade), which could be terminated by a
weighted legislative majority.
IV. THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
FOSTERING THE RULE OF LAW
Full-face confrontation between a handful of determined justices on
the one hand, and Parliament or President, on the other, is the high
drama of judicial review. While replete with arresting literary qualities,
judicial review is far less important to the protection of human rights
and the coincident deepening of democratic governance than routine
review of acts and omissions by the foot soldiers of the state, including
its security forces. Democracy works for and is sustained by citizens.
Citizenship in its true sense is not a blessing enjoyed by the entire
native-born population of most Latin states. Latin America's
marginalized inhabitants-favela-dwellers, street people, landless rural
laborers, and indigenous groups--enjoy it in name only." Citizens
have a sense of possessing rights, enforceable claims against their fellow
citizens and public officials. True, they may have to pay informal gratuities to make some of those claims good, but as long as the tariff is
reasonably predictable, gratuities are hardly distinguishable in their effects from the user fees charged for certain services by the most fastidious of governments. The key element of true citizenship is having
some sense of influence over one's environment, a sensation of enjoying
a zone of autonomous existence. This sense endows its possessors with
dignity, and with the confidence that they can plan their lives. The
ominous bulk of force majeure does not shadow their every move. They
are citizens. Tens-of-millions of Latin Americans are not.
Supreme Court review of acts of parliament and presidential decrees
will not substantially alter their condition. They require workaday redress of grievances and vindication of claims for licenses to work, for
enforcement of labor codes, and for access to what few public services
are nominally their due. An important question facing leaders of new or
renewed democracies is whether and how the existing judicial system
can become an instrument of quotidian justice.

148.

See

LATIN AiEfRICAN CENTER PUBLICATIONS, UNIvERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT

30 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF LATIN AMERICA 275-77 (James A.
Wilkie et al. eds., 1993) (providing a basis for comparing political and civil rights
among Latin American countries).
LOS
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One key to popular justice is money. In most countries the judicial
system is a budgetary stepchild. Salaries are poor and working conditions abominable. I have interviewed a judge of first instance in a Central American country. His "chambers" are a room with a fan that hardly stirs the beads of sweat on the leprous walls. It is morning. The man
looks weary. His secretary sits in one comer pecking at a typewriter I
could import as a non-dutiable antique. On sagging shelves papers bulge
from broken files. A formless mass of concerned parties wait stoically,
without visible expectation, on the threshold.
Having witnessed this "tableaux vivant" directly or through proxies,
sympathetic members of the international aid-giving community are now
investing funds and offering technical assistance to upgrade the working
conditions of the judiciary. Computers, air conditioning, space, and paint
will presumably contribute to efficiency and dignity, will enhance the attractions of the profession, and possibly make its members more vigorous and resolute. 49' But one wonders whether so formal a system of
justice as the one which operates with variations in all of Latin America
can ever effectively cope with the needs of the popular classes. At least
to a superficial observer like myself, it seems ponderous and far too
dependant on the written word, particularly in countries where illiteracy
remains widespread. 5 '
A quantum leap in justice for the popular classes may require a radical streamlining and deformalization of judicial procedure, as well as
two other important developments. One necessary development is a vast
increase in representation for the poor. For the foreseeable future, traditional legal assistance programs will not suffice, since the number of
poor people in need of assistance is too great. Full-time lawyers for the
poor-supplemented by volunteers with paralegal training, and supported
by government funds, churches, and public and private sources in the
OECD countries--can provide cadres. Perhaps the full-time lawyers can
come from the ranks of recent law school graduates, if this type of
public interest work were to become a mandatory condition of entry to
the bar.

149. Permanent improvement in the material conditions of the justice system obviously cannot be achieved exclusively through foreign assistance. Assistance can
provide direction and incentives. It cannot substitute for the will to increase the justice system's share of the state budget, which in country's like Guatemala, where the
rich pay only nominal taxes, means also the will to increase the general revenues of
government.
150. LATIN AMERICAN CENTER PUBLICATIONS, supra note 148, at 212-15.
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In addition to representation for the poor, the second necessary development is the creation, where it does not exist, and expansion, where it
does exist, of an institution modeled after the Fiscal Publico in Venezuela. The Fiscal Publico is an ombudsman-like position, equivalent in
Venezuela to Cabinet rank, filled by parliamentary election rather than
presidential appointment. The Fiscal Publico investigates allegations of
corruption, defends human rights, and is broadly responsible for assuring
that public officials comply with the law. Lawyers who work for the
Fiscal may, for instance, inspect jails and observe police behavior in
controlling demonstrations. As I envision the office, it would monitor
the judiciary as well as the executive branch, and might even have a
measure of coercive power rather than just the responsibility for bringing cases before the courts.
V. PRESIDENTIALISM, GRIDLOCK,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
Presidential government has become the Latin American norm since
independence, maintaining its paradigmatic status through a long historical night episodically illuminated by economic or political disaster. After
studying the recent, as well as the older transitions to and from democracy, an influential band of scholars' has concluded that institutions
of parliamentary democracy are inherently better equipped for survival
and success under the conditions prevailing in Latin America and Eastem Europe. Indeed, they claim it would enjoy comparative advantage in
most countries. These scholars do not think it a mere coincidence that
practically all of the world's established democracies, with the single
exception of the United States, utilize some form of parliamentary government.
The proponents of parliamentary democracy make a strong a priori
argument backed by detailed case studies." Presidential government,
as they perceive it, suffers from a number of serious defects. One is the
difficulty of removing a president before the end of the constitutionallyprescribed term, even when that president suffers an irreversible collapse
of public confidence.'
While an established democracy may survive

151. See, e.g., JUAN LINZ & ARTHUR VALENZUELA, THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEaOCRACY (1994); Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. Dai. 62

(1990); Arthur Valenzuela, Latin America: Presidentialism in Crisis, 4 J. Dal. 3

(1993).
152. See infra notes 154-55.
153. See Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition to Democracy. Corporatism and Consti-
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the consequent deflation in the perceived legitimacy of governmental
institutions, one that is not yet deeply-rooted may not. Survival is particularly problematic in countries where the military has a tradition of
stepping in to fill political vacancies.
The effort to end the crisis of legitimacy through impeachment is
uncertain, prolonged, and traumatic even when the collapse of confidence stems form the target's crimes and misdemeanors; when the only
material delinquencies are ineptitude and bad luck, impeachment is virtually impossible. In a parliamentary system, its proponents argue, no
more is necessary than a vote of no-confidence made possible by the
predictable shift of erstwhile supporters fearful for their political lives.
The connection between successful administration of the country's
affairs and the political health of legislators ties in to a second virtue of
parliamentary government: the lack of policy gridlock which arises from
conflict between the executive and legislative branches.' 54 The leaders
of government remain members of parliamentary parties. If the former
fail, all members of the parliamentary party suffer.'55 Consequently, in
addition to their personal hopes of holding office in the future, ordinary
members of the parliamentary party have a powerful incentive to support
the government.'56 Prime Ministers and their cabinet associates also
have an incentive not to pursue policies which are abhorrent to average
members. This incentive arises because regardless of whether the Prime
Minister and cabinet are selected by a proportional representation system
or in a constituency, as the "first past the post," they have no independent national base of support. The Prime Minister can neither reasonably
claim nor easily imagine having been chosen by and thereby acquired
something like a mystic bond to the people along with a virtually absolute discretion for the length of the Presidential term to decide where to
steer the ship of state.'57
The existential condition of Latin America aggravates, and is in turn
aggravated by, the endemic tendencies of the presidential system. Violent swings in economic momentum occur with sufficient frequency that
few presidential terms pass without them.' Violent turndowns almost
tutional Reform in Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 129, 153 (1989) (stating that
the process of impeachment is almost impossible to carry out).
154. See id. at 148-49 (citing executive-legislative confrontations as a major reason
for the failure of more than 30 presidential regimes outside the United States).
155. See id. at 149 (contrasting presidential and parliamentary forms of government
in that the former provides "little incentive to remain faithful to the party").
156. Id.
157. Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEM. 55 (1994).
158. See Stotzky, supra note 1, at 124-26 (analyzing the impact of economic trou-
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invariably eviscerate the reigning president's legitimacy. The region remains the home of military establishments, still living apart from civil
society, still very much a state within the state, still imagining themselves both as stewards of the national essence, and as more virtuous
and competent than civilian governments. The military views presidential
administrations that lose their authority and executive-legislative gridlock
as occasions calling for exercise of the steward's function.
If the generality of Latin American political parties were
well-organized representatives of distinct social interests with programs
corresponding to those interests, presidential elections would be more
programmatic in content, and presidential mandates would be more
specific and inclined toward convergence with the programs of the dominant parties in the legislature. Enduring parties with enduring programs
would give greater continuity to policy, and would tend to dominate the
selection of presidential candidates. As things now stand in Latin American countries like Brazil, established parties are strong enough to dominate legislative elections, but not to block hitherto obscure outsiders
from surging out of nowhere into the presidential office. When outsiders
take over the presidency, the parties in the legislature see no advantages
accruing to them from the president's success. As a result, there is no
incentive for cooperation and gridlock often follows.
The elements of the presidential and parliamentary systems of government are not entirely incompatible." 9 A number of democratic countries have tried a certain amount of mixing and matching in the search
for optimal political arrangements."W The main Western European form
of government is parliamentarianism, with a president as the largely
ceremonial head of state where no monarch is available to play the role.
This ceremonial president is, however, not directly elected. Under
Charles DeGaulle, France adopted a more genuinely mixed system.'6 '
It has a directly elected president authorized to represent the country in
foreign relations, regardless of who commands parliament. The president
has far more problematical authority, however, over domestic matters,

bles on Argentinean Presidents Alfonsin and Menem).
159. See Nino, supra note 153, at 156-57 (discussing mixed systems of government which combine the advantages of presidentialism with those of parliamentary
government).

160. See id. at 147-52 (recounting various attempts at mixed government by Brazil, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina).
161. See generally F.L. Morton, Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis, 36 AM. J. Con,. LAw 89 (1988) (discussing the French system of government in
the context of judicial review).
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when opposing parties dominate the legislative branch. President
Mitterand, a Socialist, cohabited if not happily, then at least rather quietly, with conservative prime ministers largely by leaving domestic issues
to them. It is difficult to predict whether such an arrangement can work
with a less cautious person as president, in a time when politics are
more polarized.
Latin America's presidentialist states might seek to mitigate the defects of presidentialism by altering the constitution to allow the president
to appoint members of parliament to the cabinet, without them having to
surrender their seats and hence their power bases. This change might
facilitate coalition government, which is considered a virtue by advocates of parliamentarianism. It is unclear whether presidents from outside
the traditional party structure would have sufficient incentives to exploit
the opportunity, and whether parliamentary leaders of the traditional
parties would have sufficient reason to accept cabinet positions. Oneterm limits may render presidents loath to share the patronage. Presidents with one term and an agenda shaped by ideological passions may
not want to compromise their perceived popular mandate unless and
until they experience an implosion of popular support, at which time
parliamentary leaders have little reason to participate.
The case for parliamentary government remains stronger in the scholarly literature than in politics. When Brazilian voters had the option to
choose a parliamentary government as part of the reconstruction of
democratic institutions after a long period of military rule, they soundly
rejected it. 62 In other countries, the possibility of parliamentary government has not even entered serious political discourse. For the time
being, at least, it appears that Latin America will have what it can out
of presidential government.
CONCLUSION
To paraphrase an F. Scott Fitzgerald heroine, the only thing you can
say with confidence about the future of democratic politics in Latin
America is that there is little you can say with confidence. In historical
terms, democracy is a recent and only lightly tested phenomenon. It has

162. See James Brooke, Latin America in Flux; Economic Ills Sap Brazilians'
Faith in Democracy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 1993, at A10; Katherine Ellison, Brazilians
Opt for 'Devil They Know,' CALGARY HER., Apr. 22, 1993, at A18; Brazil: Latest
Poll Data Shows People Still Want a President, Inter Press Service Global Information Network, Apr. 26, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Allnws database, Interps file
(1993).
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appeared most enduring in countries that enjoy relative homogeneity of
race and culture, an electorate dominated by a combination of the bourgeoisie and workers in secure jobs that provide something at least close
to a middle-class life style, and overall, a high and still improving standard of living. A number of Latin countries-Argentina, Costa Rica,
Chile, and Uruguay-possess the first of those characteristics.'" Many
others do not. Very few possess the second and third. Long-standing
democracies are also characterized by the rule of law, in the sense in
which I have used that term. Of course the rule of law is in part a
symptom of democracy consolidated, but it is also a cause. In most
countries in Latin America, it is not a salient feature even of middleclass life.
Although there are ample grounds for pessimism about the success of
democracies in Latin America, past experience may not extrapolate well.
Anti-democratic ideologies seem at least temporarily exhausted in the
world at large, and particularly in Latin America. Corresponding to that
exhaustion is a growing belief in the intrinsic virtue of the liberal values
or rights which are immanent in democratic systems.' " In this regard,
the experience of state terror in Latin America had an important pedagogical effect. Another promising difference in today's Latin America is
the strength of civil society, as reflected by the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations, particularly in the fields of human rights,
economic development, and the environment.'" Thus, while Latin
America is far from the end of ideological conflict and authoritarian
temptations, at least there is reason to doubt that its peoples are condemned to revisit their past.
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